Top 5 Supersonic And Hypersonic Weapons Companies
MBDA
Tactical Missiles Corporation
The Boeing Company
Raytheon Technologies Corporation
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Source: Mordor Intelligence
Supersonic And Hypersonic Weapons Companies Matrix by Mordor Intelligence
Our comprehensive proprietary performance metrics of key Supersonic And Hypersonic Weapons players beyond traditional revenue and ranking measures
The MI Matrix can rank firms differently because it weighs delivery signals, not just booked revenue. It rewards proof of repeatable production, funded testing, and credible paths from prototypes into deployable weapon rounds. It also picks up practical reach, such as where a firm can build, integrate, and export under today's rules. Supersonic weapons typically rely on sustained high speed flight with airframe and seeker designs that tolerate heating and vibration. Hypersonic glide vehicles usually boost high, then glide and maneuver, which raises demands on thermal protection and guidance. For buyers, useful indicators include recent flight trials, new propulsion factories, export approvals, and consistent delivery cadence. That is why this MI Matrix by Mordor Intelligence is more useful for supplier and competitor evaluation than revenue tables alone.
MI Competitive Matrix for Supersonic And Hypersonic Weapons
The MI Matrix benchmarks top Supersonic And Hypersonic Weapons Companies on dual axes of Impact and Execution Scale.
Analysis of Supersonic And Hypersonic Weapons Companies and Quadrants in the MI Competitive Matrix
Comprehensive positioning breakdown
Raytheon Technologies Corporation
Program funding and contract actions since 2024 keep Raytheon positioned at the center of US air breathing hypersonic work. In June 2024, Raytheon, a leading vendor, received a US Department of Defense contract modification tied to Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile and SCIFiRE work, which supports risk reduction hardware and testing through 2027. Budget signals also favored continued development, indicating durable government priority even when schedules move. If flight testing stabilizes, Raytheon can convert prototype work into repeatable production, yet propulsion integration complexity is the main weakness.
Lockheed Martin Corporation
New infrastructure spending is tightening the link between design iteration and fieldable hypersonic weapon integration. In December 2025, Lockheed, a top manufacturer, opened a hypersonic systems integration lab in Huntsville tied to a wider USD 529.0 million capital investment plan. Lockheed also secured a 2023 contract for integrating sea based hypersonic strike capability onto US Navy surface ships, which anchors demand around system integration depth. If procurement timing improves, the upside is volume learning, but changing requirements can create costly rework.
MBDA
European program maturity has become the clearest signal of MBDA's next wave of high speed strike capability. In September 2025 MBDA unveiled STRATUS as the new name for the Future Cruise and Anti Ship Weapon effort, with two complementary missile designs shown as the program advances toward a development phase. National procurement rules and cross border governance can slow decisions, but they also create barriers for new entrants. If European deep strike budgets expand, MBDA can widen its design to production bridge, while multi nation alignment remains the persistent execution risk.
Frequently Asked Questions
What proof points show a company can deliver hypersonic weapons, not just prototypes?
Look for repeat flight trials, production oriented facilities, and funded risk reduction hardware. Also check whether integration on real platforms has started.
How should a defense buyer compare two missile primes with similar capabilities?
Compare test cadence, subsystem maturity, and the ability to scale seekers, propulsion, and thermal protection materials. Past delivery reliability under surge demand matters as much as headline performance.
What are the biggest execution risks in high speed weapon programs today?
Thermal protection materials, guidance reliability at high heat, and limited test range capacity can slow timelines. Supplier fragility and export restrictions can also delay critical components.
How do export controls change supplier selection for these weapons?
Export rules can limit who receives certain seekers, propulsion parts, or software, even among allies. Buyers should confirm licensing pathways and data handling controls early.
What role do propulsion and scramjet specialists play versus system integrators?
Propulsion specialists reduce risk in engines, inlet design, and high temperature manufacturing. Integrators must still prove safe carriage, launch interfaces, and end to end system performance.
Which indicators best predict who will scale production over the next two years?
Multiyear contracts, factory expansions, and measured increases in delivery rates are strong signals. Clear government budget support and stable requirements reduce the chance of rework.
Methodology
Research approach and analytical framework
Scoring uses public filings, official contract releases, defense ministry statements, and company press rooms. Private entities are assessed through contracts, facilities, tests, and sanctions or export actions. Indicators are limited to the defined scope and geographies in the provided contents. When numbers are missing, observable program momentum is triangulated across multiple credible sources.
Weapon programs depend on secure sites, test range access, and buyer proximity across the listed regions.
Defense buyers favor trusted primes with proven compliance, safety culture, and dependable classified program handling.
Program wins and deployed rounds indicate relative position in funded supersonic and hypersonic weapon activity.
Propulsion plants, integration labs, and seeker lines determine whether output can scale beyond prototypes.
Since 2023, flight trials and new designs show who can handle heat loads, guidance, and maneuvering.
Contract size and multiyear awards signal staying power through long test cycles and slow procurement ramps.
